ABSTRACT. When it comes to financial decision-making like predicting stock price movements, it would be conceivable that rational people had an advantage over intuitive people. An experiment was conducted to test this hypothesis. Participants of the experiment provided repeated estimates for different shares and it was expected that rational people would end up with more 'correct' answers than intuitive people. Additionally, all participants of the experiment (N=59) completed a PID scale questionnaire (Betsch, 2004; Schunk & Betsch, 2006) to evaluate their preferences for deliberate or intuitive decision-making. The PID scale provided four categories to group people according to their preferences. In summary, it was concluded that intuitive people were slightly, but not significantly, better with financial decisionmaking than were rational people. A higher significance was observed from a direct comparison of the four PID categories. Predictions of PID-S-plus participants were significantly more accurate.
Introduction
The effect of intuitive and deliberate approaches to decision making is a field that is of interest not only within academia, but also for business and many other fields (like politics, prosecutors). In the influential and well perceived book "Heuristics and Biases -The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement (Gilivich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002 ) are a few chapters that are focused to a large extend on the effects of intuition on decision making (e.g., Tversky, & Kahneman, 2002; Tetlock, 2002) . However, there are still numerous unanswered questions regarding the effects of intuitive and deliberate decision making approaches. In the same book you can read a chapter on financial analysts" decision making witch concludes with the observation that financial analyst are not always rational and ends with the question: "After all, are not these practitioners the very same "smart money" that is supposed to keep markets rational?" (De Bondt, & Thaler, 2002) . In the following years many researchers contributed to gain a better understanding on the effects of intuition, conscious analysis and rationality on the decision making and forecasting quality (e.g., Acker, 2008; Harteis, & Gruber, 2008; Aczel, Lukacs, Komlos, Aitken & others, 2011) . Nevertheless, it appears that there are many Endress, T., Gear, T. (2015) uncertainties" in this field. A particularly vivid example might be the observation that the role of intuition in recruiting process of experts and managers is an ongoing discussion in academic literature. Taneja & Arora (2015) suggest "the use of reliable and validated tests to measure managerial inventiveness". This paper aims to contribute in this context and presents some preliminary results of individual decision-making behaviour from an online experiment. The underlying assumption was that in the context of financial decision-making like predicting stock price movements, it would be conceivable that rational people had an advantage. An experiment was conducted to test this hypothesis. Participants of the experiment provided repeated estimates for different shares and it was expected that rational people end up with more "correct" answers than intuitive people. This experiment was part of an online experiment with several groups. The purpose of the overall study was to investigate and to understand the group decision-making process of Internet communities that focus on stock trading, based on predicting share movements and prices (like Marketocracy or sharewise) (Endress, 2015; Endress & Gear, 2013) . Several studies have already been conducted to assess the quality of the resulting recommendations from financial analysts (Bolliger, 2004; Clement, 1999; Fleischer, 2005; Stanzel, 2007) and there is a huge body of literature concerning economic forecasting (Elliott & Timmermann, 2013) and company valuation (e.g., Damodaran, 2006; Koller & McKinsey and Company, 2010; Ryan, 2007) . But it is a fact that, by now, these studies show little evidence that it is possible to generate predictions that create, in the long run and after transaction costs, profits higher than the market average (Malkiel, 2007; Stanzel, 2007) .
Experiment Design and Data Analysis
The experiment was performed with three lay groups totalling 49 participants, and two expert groups totalling ten financial analysts and other stock market professionals. The forecasts were benchmarked with actual market prices as well as with each other, over ten eDelphi cycles (ten weeks). The field experiment was conducted following an e-Delphi (Dalkey & Helmer-Hirschberg, 1962; Lindqvist & Nordänger, 2007) approach. Each e-Delphi cycle in this experiment consisted of a first stage for data collection of predictions. Generally, these data were compiled and distributed back to the group, but to measure the effect, some groups were set up without a feedback loop. In a second round, participants were able to provide different responses. The groups of the experiment were purposely selected and structured as follows:
1. Analyst Group (AG) with a group size of 5 participants.
2. e-Delphi-Group (EDG) with a group size of 21 participants. 3. Interactive Group (IG) with a group size of 7 participants. 4. Non-Feedback Group (NFG) with a group size of 21 participants. 5. Professional Investors Group (PG) with a group size of 5 participants. 6. Single Expert/ Financial Analyst (Expert). The three groups of lay people followed slightly different approaches. The lay people e-Delphi-Group (EDG) followed an e-Delphi process (see Figure 1 ). The interactive group followed basically the same process but additionally had the opportunity to communicate with the other group members. The third group, the non-feedback group (NFG), also followed the same process, but there was no feedback from other group members available to them. These settings were supposed to allow a comparison of the influence of group feedback on the decision-making process. Preliminary findings of the group results have been presented already (e.g., Endress, 2014 Endress, , 2015 Endress & Gear, 2013) . However, the individual decisionmaking of the participants was also part of the analysis. An analysis of the individual prediction performances compared with the individual characteristics of the participants, as established before the experiment, were planned to identify attributes that might influence prediction quality. The results of the experiment suggest that the preference for intuition and/or deliberation (PID score) is such an attribute. The analysis presented in this paper is focused on the results from the individuals as compared with their corresponding PID scores.
Both groups, AG and PG; overall ten professionals, were from four different financial services companies with offices in Germany. All individuals of the professional groups were highly qualified and had access to several professional investment information services (e.g., Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, industry reports, in-house research material). The first group of professionals, the Analyst Group, consisted of five financial analysts with many years of industry experience. In the group results of the AG are all the forecasts from the analysts, including forecasts for stocks within and outside their professional coverage. The Single Expert results are a subset of these forecasts, but only where the expert had active coverage of the stock as well. In the AG, all group participants worked as individuals and there were no group results or any other feedback provided during the run. The second group of Financial Professionals (PG) consisted of investment professionals including portfolio managers, equity traders, or salespersons. The PG followed an e-Delphi approach similar to the EDG.
Undecided voting results -that is, for equal numbers of forecasts for "up" and "down" -were excluded. Missing votes from single experts were also excluded. movement (up or down) over a one-week, one-month, and three-month period for every share as well as to enter a stock price prediction (in percent up or down) for a three-month period. The different stock also had different price movements during the examination period: while some stocks went mostly up (Adidas +36.56%, HeidelbergCement +43.04%) others were going down (RWE -12.4%, ThyssenKrupp -8.67%) or showed a sideward tendency and no clear direction (Siemens +5.18%).
PID Preference Assessment of the Participants
To understand more about the group decision-making process, it might be helpful to understand more about the decision-making process of the individual group participants as well. In order to gain more understanding of the individual decision-making process, an individual assessment of the participants was done for all participants of the experiment. This assessment included age, gender, education level, profession, and decision-making type. While the questions about age, gender, education level, and profession are quite easy to answer, the question about the decision-making type is not easy to address for each participant. An approach to address this question was developed by Cornelia Betsch (2004; Schunk & Betsch, 2006; Traufetter, 2009 ). She created and tested a questionnaire (see appendix) to determine the preference for intuition and/or deliberation of persons (PID). An assessment of all participants was proposed to help to understand the reasons for particular predictions and to ensure that the three groups were equally diverse in terms of the assessed criteria.
The following analysis shows the preliminary results from the individual decisionmaking of the participants according to their respective PID scores. The PID scale provides four categories to group people according to their preferences. There are people with a preference for deliberate decisions (PID-D), people with a preference for deliberate intuitive (PID-I), and people with situational, varying preferences, whereas people either have a preference for both intuitive and deliberate decision-making (PID-S plus) strategies or without a preference for any strategy (PID-S minus). Additionally, it could be observed that within the professional groups, even more PID-D scores are found. Six of the participating professionals scored as PID-D, two as PID-S minus, and only one as PID-I and one as PID-S plus.
Comparison of PID-D and PID-I Scores
The overall accuracy of people with a preference for deliberate decision-making was 50.9% and the overall accuracy of people with a preference for deliberate decision-making was 51.5% (see Table 2 ). Apparently, this is not a very significant difference. This direct comparison of PID-D and PID-I prediction quality tested with a Chi-Square test resulted in a Chi-square of 0.189 and p-value=0.66. 
Comparison of All Predictions Grouped by PID Scale Score
More interesting than the comparison of PID-I and PID-D scores might be a comparison that includes all PID-types and in particular, the result that a preference for both intuitive and deliberate decision-making strategies (PID-S plus) leads to significantly better predictions (see Table 3 ). This direct comparison of all four categories' predictions quality was tested with a Chi-Square test resulting in a Chi-square of 10.084 and p-value=0.018. These results are in a way affirmative of the explanatory scheme from Philip Tetlock (2005) and his interpretation of the metaphor of "the hedgehog and the fox." In his analysis, the aggregated success rate of the fox's predictions was considerably better compared with hedgehog"s, and he states that, "Foxes were not especially likely to endorse particular substantive positions on rationality, level of analysis, macroeconomics, or foreign policy" (Tetlock, 2005, p. 106) . Perhaps, it is an advantage for forecasters to apply multiple, i.e., deliberate and intuitive, strategies. 
Synopsis and Conclusion
Following the hypothesis that rational people have an advantage, it would be expected that rational people end up with the highest number of correct answers. In summary, it can be concluded that this hypothesis is not supported by the data gathered with the experiment. However, the data gathered with the experiment indicated that intuitive people might have a slight advantage in terms of prediction quality. This means that an inverted version of the hypothesis would be correct: Intuitive people are better with financial decision-making compared with rational persons. This is supported by the data, although the data are not significant in a direct comparison of PID-I and PID-D results at a level of significance of .05. A higher significance could be observed for the direct comparison of all four categories. Predictions of PID-S-plus participants are apparently of significantly higher accuracy. Still, these findings are from an experiment with a limited number of participants and should be repeated with a larger sample size and in different settings. Further research might be helpful to gain a better understanding of possible limitations and the underlying mechanisms. 
